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Love and the CapaCity to Love
an ontoLogiCaL anaLysis of Love aCCording to 





This paper will elaborate on the different concepts of love as offered by 
Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Sina; two prominent thinkers representing 
the Christian and Islamic tradition. Risālah fī al- ‘ishq (The Treatise 
on Love) of Ibn Sina is comparable – in terms of theological and 
philosophical approaches – to the Aquinas’ treatment of love in Summa 
Theologiae II-IIae q.23, a.2. I argue that since Ibn Sina’s ontological 
definition of love is related tightly to his cosmogony, then there is no 
rigid distinction between the love of the Pure Being and the contingent 
beings. Love acts as a “medium” of unification and perfection towards 
the Pure Being. The different levels of love are already determined in 
the contingent beings according to the principle of harmonia during 
the emanative process. For Aquinas, love is present only in the rational 
being as it is a grace of God, the Holy Spirit himself. But this similar 
notion of Aristotelian harmonia in Aquinas (1) would never be able to 
blur the wide, apparent discrepancy between God and human beings. 
(2) Through the model of rational love as an intellectual counsel, we 
can see that there is no sense of determinism on Aquinas’ concept of 
rational love.
Keywords: 
rational love, divine love, human love, Risālah fī al-‘ishq, ontological 
analysis
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 introduCtion
There are many elements in the word ‘love’: individual, communal, 
religious, and secular. Those elements are each motivated by different 
subjects and situations, by various desires and wills. As a common human 
experience, love is often interpreted as a ‘warm’ sensation from emotion 
or sentiment. For this reason, love is also often contrasted with the ‘cold’ 
calculation of ‘ratio’ or knowledge. The intertwined relationship between 
love and knowledge might rightfully represent the two major approaches 
in today’s moral cognition. Some moral philosophers consider the role of 
love (and other faculties of the appetites) in shaping our knowledge. Yet, 
some other philosophers choose to recognize the independence of both 
faculties in moral cognition.1
This paper will investigate Thomas Aquinas’ and Ibn Sina’s concept 
of rational love concerning its ontological nature and its theological 
presumptions. Both thinkers place this ontological issue of love as an 
essential part of their writings. We can understand this since both 
religious traditions emphasize the role of love as a moral basis in their 
doctrines of relationship with God and with neighbors.2 This paper will 
specifically analyze the Ibn Sina’s Risālah fī al-‘ishq compared with 
Summa Theologiae (hereafter: Summa or ST), II-IIae q. 23, a. 2. In these 
two texts, we can find the fundamental thoughts on the nature of human 
capacity to love. Like most of the comparative research, I choose the 
method of maximizing similarities and differences among the compared 
variables to find the interconnectedness and the disparities between 
these two scholars.3 This comparative work will start first by (1) a short 
clarification on the word ‘love’ in Latin and Arabic terminology. There 
are some complications in this word since the English term for ‘love’ 
has a broader sense in Latin and Arabic traditions. This clarification 
is essential not only for understanding the texts but also to justify the 
philosophical assessment between the two different traditions. I will then 
(2) explore the ontological analysis on the Divine-being as the source of 
1  One of the most debated philosophical themes in the moral psychology’s empirical researches 
is the arguments among the sentimentalists against rationalists concerning the nature of moral 
judgment. Cf. Jillian Craigie, “Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-process 
Framework,” Philosophical Psychology 24, Nr. 1 (2011) 53-56. 
2  Cf. Mt 22: 34-40; Mk 12: 28-34; Lk 10:2 - Quran 2:177; Quran 21:90
3  Malcolm L. Goggin, “The ‘Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables’ Problem in Implementation 
Research.” Political Research Quarterly 39, Nr. 2 (1986) 333-34.
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knowledge and love both for Aquinas and Ibn Sina. We will see how 
the different cosmological concepts affect human nature and his/her 
capacity to love God. (3) The notion of will and passion will be delivered 
next as a point of departure for understanding the deterministic and 
indeterministic character of love for Aquinas and Ibn Sina. I will further 
elaborate these descriptions with the discussion of passion, will, and 
love.
terminoLogy
To avoid unnecessary confusion in this comparative work, I propose 
to use the generic English word ‘love’ as the translation of both the Latin 
caritas and the Arabic قشع (‘ishq). Ibn-Sīnā’s word ‘ishq can also be 
translated into the Latin dilectio. Dilection is a word that Aquinas often 
uses in an interchangeable manner when he refers to ‘love’ as amor 
or caritas. In the Latin text of ST, IIa IIae, q. 23, a. 2., the Latin term 
caritas is translated into English as ‘charity,’ which in general lexicon 
has a similar meaning with ‘love.’ We understand the word caritas in 
relation to the other two different Latin vocabularies: amor and dilectio. 
At ST Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 3, Aquinas delivers this question: “Is love (amor) 
the same as dilection (dilectio)?” He answers that the words “love, 
dilection, charity and friendship” (amor, dilectio, caritas, amicitia) are 
“four words that refer, in a way, to the same thing.” Yet, the word amo 
and amor in the context of medieval time has a specific meaning in 
the Vulgate, a reference which Aquinas is familiar with.  According to 
Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary, amo is used 51 times in the Vulgate, 
while amor emerges 20 times. In contrast, diligo (and dilectus) are used 
422 times, dilectio 43 times, and caritas 101 times.4 Amo is less used 
in Vulgate probably because it has another meaning “to have sex with,” 
and its adjective form could be used to describe “animals in heat.”5 In 
his introduction to the translation of the Commentary on the Sentences, 
Kwasniewski writes: “The basic difference (between these terms) is 
that amicitia is like a habit, whereas amor and dilectio are actions or 
passions, and caritas can be taken either way.”6 In the etymological sense, 
4  Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary, s.v. “Amo,” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=amo&highlight=amo(access 02.08.2020).
5  Tali Folkins, “Amor is not a Nice Word,” Opening the Vita Nuovo Blog (August 2017). https://
vitanuovasite.wordpress.com/2017/02/08/amor-is-not-a-nice-word/ (access 02.07.2020).
6  Thomas Aquinas, On Love and Charity: Readings from the “Commentary on the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard,” ed. Peter Kwasniewski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
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it seems that there are distinctions made for these equivalent words, but 
both Lombard and Aquinas use these terms fluidly and synonymously. 
Kwasniewski insists one ought not to be troubled to translate these four 
terms into the English word ‘love.’7
In Arabic, there are at least two standard terms for ‘love.’ The Arabic 
word بح  (hubb) is widely used in various backgrounds: ardent love, love 
between spouses, love between members of a family, love between human and 
God.8 The Arabic word قشع (‘ishq) – the term specifically mentioned 
in the discussed Risālah of Ibn Sina – has a restricted meaning of 
“passionate love” or “desire” and generally refer to the love in a romantic 
relationship. But there is also another explanation from Capezzone who 
argues that “Avicenna [Ibn Sina] identifies in ‘ishq a propulsive and 
dynamic force that holds the whole universe; through desire it drives 
and elevates the soul.”9 I would like to point that this paper is aware of 
the difficulties of translating the complete Arabic sense of what ‘ishq is 
in English term. While being aware of these specific meanings of ‘ishq, 
I found that Fackenheim loosely translates this word as “love” in his 
translation of Risālah fī al-’Ishq. In the more inclusive approach of Ibn 
Sina’s works, I believe that we can justify the translation of ‘ishq to 
English word “love” as long as we know the different contexts of the 
passages being used.10
the divine nature of Love
Despite the different meanings of the word ‘love,’ Aquinas and Ibn 
Sina agree that human capacity to love comes from the divine being. 
This love comes through the emanation process for Ibn Sina and the 
grace of God for Aquinas. Ibn Sina emphasizes love in the cosmological 
sense as the medium of unity between humans and God. While agreeing 
on the divine nature of love, Thomas Aquinas has a different ontological 
2008), xxi-ii.
7  Thomas Aquinas, On Love and Charity: Readings from the., xxiii
8  Cambridge English Arabic Dictionary, s.v. “Love,” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english-arabic/love (access 02.07.2020).
9  Leonardo Capezzone, Encyclopedia of Mediterranean Humanism, s.v. “’Ishq,” http://www.
encyclopedie-humanisme.com/ishq. (access 02.07.2020).
10  Please also note that it is the author’s choice to translate the Arabic word قشع (‘ishq) simply 
into “love” in this research paper as I use only the Fackenheim’s translation of Ibn Sina’s Risālah 
fī al-‘ishq. The translation of Summa Theologiae used in this paper is taken from the New Advent. 
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standpoint from what Ibn Sina thinks. Aquinas treats the love between the 
creature and God as one of a part to whole, not in Ibn Sina’s pantheistic 
way, but rather in terms of the “doctrine of participation,” by which each 
creature has in a partial form of perfection that is found in the complete 
or perfect form only in God. In my opinion, Ibn Sina understands love 
mainly in the natural-cosmological context, while Aquinas frames his 
understanding of love more in the Christian theological understanding 
of God. This different approach would later affect their concepts of what 
love is and how human beings would have the capacity to love. 
Ibn Sina: Love as the Medium of Unity between 
Human and God
The concept of love in Risālah fī al-‘ishq should be framed in Ibn 
Sina’s cosmological conception. In the relation between God and the 
universe, wherein all things are known by the Pure Good because of 
the necessity of its existence, love then belongs to His essence alone. 
The first chapter of Risālah fi al-’Ishq shows the Highest Being, whose 
qualities are Pure, Good, Great, and Love, is above all creatures.  11 Pure 
goodness is inherent in the Highest Being that does not need matter for 
its existence. All “lower” contingent beings – the creations – as the results 
of this emanating Pure Good, seek and desire life in material reality. 
Anwar writes that, for Ibn Sina, “the overflowing emanation process 
results from God’s intellection of His essence that radiates the Universal 
Intellect, Soul, Nature, Body and the multiplicity of the world.”12 
Ibn Sina believes that goodness is built upon the Pure Good’s two 
primary characteristics: the independence from material contingencies 
and the immunity from nothingness. Despite their being created in 
these material contingencies, all other beings possess inborn love for 
the Highest Being, the supreme subject and object of love. This Highest 
Being is the origin of the cosmos and the destination where the universe 
returns to its perfection. Fackhenheim writes that “Ibn Sina frames this 
movement towards perfection in the traditional Platonic division of the soul 
into the appetitive, animal, and rational parts. Each part of the human soul has 
a specific type and particular objects of love: (1) sexual gratification and food 
for the appetitive part; (2) the victory, supremacy, and revenge for the animal-
11  Ibn Sina, On Treatise of Love (Risālah fī al-‘ishq), trans. Emil L. Fackenheim, Mediaeval Studies 7, Nr. 
1 (1945) 212-214.
12  Etin Anwar, “Ibn Sina’s Philosophical Theology of Love: A Study of the Risālah fī al-‘ishq,” Islamic 
Studies 42, Nr. 2 (2003): 334.
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emotional part; and (3) the knowledge and the acquisition of perfection for the 
last part.”13 This explains the possibility of “lesser” good already present 
in the human and his natural existence. Through this active “process of 
loving,” the contingent beings seek greater involvement in goodness in 
real life.14 Rational love, as a consequence of the emanation, is present in 
all created beings. So, rational love is not a privilege of the human-beings 
only. Rundgren explains that inanimate beings possess love, which is the 
cause of their being. He points out that Ibn Sina’s Risālah holds the 
view that the vegetative forms (or souls) show their love in their desire 
for nutrition, growth, and procreation.15 Denomy further analyzes that 
love in the animal soul, according to Risālah fi al-’Ishq, “is evident in 
its discrimination of what is pleasing and displeasing for external sense-
perception. [It is also evident in] its enjoyment of pleasant imaginations 
and its striving towards such through its internal sense faculties, and in 
its desire for mastery and avoidance of weakness in its irascible faculty.”16 
In other words, emanating rational love from the Pure Good is present 
in all beings without exception due to an overflowing good of the Highest 
Being.
However, Ibn Sina does not consider the contingent and material love 
as the Pure Good itself. Although we can sense his pantheistic approach on 
defining and explaining the position of love in the order of the emanating 
Pure Good, Ibn Sina notes that all loves, except for spiritual love and the 
love of God, belong to the perishing nature. For Ibn Sina, “the genuine 
end of all love is to lead the soul away from the sensual-bodily realm to 
the spiritual one, away from mere bodily accessory and appeal to the 
spiritual world’s elegance.”17 From this point of view, we may further ask: 
“How could this rational love, coming from the emanating Pure Good, 
that exists in the lower parts of contingent beings be perished?” There 
is a tension of dissenting concepts of rational love as being divine in its 
essence and as being parts of the perishable reality. It seems to me that 
13  Ibn Sina, On Treatise of Love (Risālah fī al-‘ishq), trans. Emil L. Fackenheim, Mediaeval Studies 7, Nr. 
1 (1945) 210. 
14  Ali Altaf Mian, “Love in Islamic Philosophy” in The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy, ed. 
Adrienne Martin (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 402. 
15  Joseph Norment Bell, “Avicenna’s Treatise on Love and the Nonphilosophical Muslim Tradition,” 
Der Islam 63, Nr. 1 (1986): 76-77.
16  Joseph Norment Bell , 76-77.
17  Ibn Sina, On Treatise of Love (Risālah fī al-‘ishq), trans. Emil L. Fackenheim, Mediaeval Studies 7, Nr. 
1 (1945) 210. 
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Ibn Sina holds a different kind of category when he talks about rational 
love. While maintaining its divine nature from the Pure being, rational 
love can also be not so pure in essence when present in appetitive and 
animal faculties. Ibn Sina writes that: 
“Rational love can, therefore, not be pure except when the animal 
faculty is altogether subdued.  With respect to the desire for 
conjugal union, it is fitting that a lover who entices the object of his 
love with this purpose in mind should be suspected, except if his 
need has a rational purpose, i.e., if his purpose is the propagation 
of the species.  … It is permissible and may find approval only in 
the case of a man with either his wife or female slave.”18
In Risālah fi al-’Ishq, while maintaining the platonic divisions of the 
Soul, Ibn Sina also puts great emphasis on the inborn human desires 
and actions of love in various levels of the soul as positive efforts to unite 
with God. Rational love, even in the “lower” parts of the soul – i.e., the 
vegetative and the animal parts – is inseparable from the Pure Good 
as the source and destination of every human being. Yet, at the same 
time, this rational and divine love is not incorruptible to the perishing 
effects of the lower parts of the physical reality. All kinds and levels of 
love in each part of the human soul always continue to exist since it is a 
perfection offered by the Pure Good to lead the contingent beings toward 
Itself. All beings are in God’s plan to strive for perfection to achieve the 
state of goodness. These ontological presumptions are essential to bridge 
the gap between the essence of rational love and the corruptibility of 
the material reality. This is why the acts of loving in kissing and sexual 
intercourse mentioned in chapter V of this Risālah, which belong to the 
animal part of the soul, are justified as ways of this unification when the 
act serves the Divine and rational purpose of the species preservation. 
These actions represent the desire for the preservation that is also shared 
in the animal-realm. 
I think we can understand Ibn Sina’s conflicting concept of the 
“corruptible rational love” if we look further at how all parts of the 
contingent beings – even from the so-called “lower parts” – desires “for 
the perfection of each being fits into the universe and God’s nature. This 
desire is shaped by design so that no entity is devoid of its perfection.”19 
18  Ibn Sina, On Treatise of Love (Risālah fī al-‘ishq), trans. Emil L. Fackenheim, Mediaeval Studies 7, Nr. 
1 (1945) 222. Italics added.
19  Etin Anwar, “Ibn Sina’s Philosophical Theology of Love: A Study of the Risālah fī al-‘ishq,” Islamic 
Studies 42, Nr. 2 (2003): 334.
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In my opinion, these dynamic and teleological elements of good – both 
in necessary and contingent beings – successfully distinguish Risālah fī 
al-‘ishq from other Islamic works before Ibn Sina. Before this Risālah, 
there were already al-Kindi’s noteworthy treatise on love, the thirty-sixth 
treatise of the Encyclopedia of the Brethren of Purity, and some scattered 
references to this subject in al-Farabi’s Theology of Aristotle.20 But in 
the great works of these preceding Muslim philosophers, the radical 
contrast between the “high” spiritual being and the “low” natural beings 
are present everywhere. In this platonic setting, this material world’s 
beauty is considered merely as inferior compared to the idea of beauty 
itself. When God is regarded as the true and the highest beauty, then 
the ‘external-material’ beauty is considered an obstacle to reaching God. 
In the Theology of Aristotle, for example, love to the external beauty, 
say of a woman, is understood as a disposition aroused by “sorcery” or 
“seduction” (sihr).21 Ibn Sina seems to shift from these previous platonic 
rigid distinctions of the idea and matter. This Risālah presents a more 
Aristotelian concept of harmonia to explain the unitive relationship 
between the Creator and the universe.
At the end of this discussion, I would like to point two distinct 
characters of love, as understood by Ibn Sina in this Risālah. First, in 
terms of ontological definition, love in Risālah fī “al-‘ishq can be considered 
as “part of the Pure Good” that is natural and inherent in human being 
and his/her actions as the consequence of the emanating Pure Good. In 
terms of function, love in Risāla” fi al”’Ishq serves more as a “medium” 
that unites the soul of the human being with the Highest Being. 
Aquinas: Love as the Participation Through Grace
There are two main Aquinas’ arguments on love. Firstly, love is 
the crowning virtue in the system of virtues. Secondly, love is infused 
in us by God.22 This section will start with the latter premise since it 
accommodates the common ground for the ontological comparisons 
with Ibn Sina’s thoughts on the divine source of love. Like Ibn Sina, 
Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae q.23, a.2 finds the study on love 
fits into the broader interpretation of God and creation. In this part of 
20  Etin Anwar, “Ibn Sina’s Philosophical Theology...”., 208-210. 
21  Etin Anwar, “Ibn Sina’s Philosophical Theology...”.,  209.
22  Jeffrey Wattles, “Aquinas on Love,” Living in Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, https://sites.google.
com/a/kent.edu/jwattles/home/ethics/aquinas-on-love (access 25.07.2020)
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Summa Theologiae, love is directly discussed in God and human beings’ 
relationship, not with any other order of creations like what we have 
seen in the Risālah fī al-‘ishq. Regarding the nature of love in human 
being, Aquinas writes: 
“Love (charity) is not something created in the soul but is the Holy 
Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that 
this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost 
Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without 
any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the 
Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance, 
the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said 
on account of the excellence of charity.”23 
Love, for Aquinas, is not the result of an emanation of the Pure Good. 
Love is not created and therefore is identical with the Holy Spirit Himself. 
For Aquinas, love is not a specific part of the Pure Good, like what Ibn 
Sina understands. Wandinger reads Aquinas ontological definition of 
God in the framework of “grace.” Since God infuses love in humans as 
a gift, “a gift that is a foretaste of glory, also known as ‘grace’ and the 
Holy Spirit Himself, in turn, transforms the horizon of the human spirit. 
The infinite formal object of the human spirit is shaped by grace.”24 
Consequently, “our intellect and will – the way we experience ourselves, 
the world, and God – have been transformed by grace.”25 In short, love is 
the uncreated grace and is “the Holy Spirit Himself, who infuses joy in 
the will. The soul’s joy, flowing over into the body, fills it with happiness 
in the form of health and incorruptible vigor.”26 Love is God’s grace, 
which is divinely placed in the human soul and helps us to will and to do 
the right thing. 
In a more specific explanation, Aquinas contends that charity, “that 
love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss” is “impossible 
without faith.”27 We must therefore inquire about what constitutes 
23  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 23. a. 2,” italics added, https://www.newadvent.
org/summa/3023.htm (access 11.07.2020)
24  Nikolaus Wandinger, “Karl Rahner on Nature and Grace,” Der Innsbrucker Theologische Leseraum, 
accessed August 15, 2020. https://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/leseraum/texte/341.html
25  Nikolaus Wandinger, “Karl Rahner on Nature and Grace,”
26  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 59, a. 5,” https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/2059.html (access 11.07.2020)
27 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 65. a.1,” https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/2065.html (access 11.07.2020)
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“faith” for Aquinas. Aquinas asserts that “explicit faith in the mysteries 
of Christ,” especially those promulgated by the Church, was required 
“after grace had been revealed.”28 Of course, this interpretation bounces 
another critical question: “Doesn’t it mean that those who do not have 
faith in Christ, and His Church cannot truly love nor have love?29” I 
decide not to go in this soteriological direction for the sake of clarity. 
Instead, I choose to return to the previous ontological explanation of 
love in Aquinas to start paralleling it with Ibn Sina.  
Aquinas’ concept of love is different from the idea of love we find 
in Ibn Sina’s Risālah fi al-’Ishq. For Aquinas, the ontological definition 
of love cannot be separated from the discourse of God’s grace and its 
relationship to human-being. Since love, for Aquinas, is such a quality of 
rational beings, it is not an inclusive quality shared among other orders 
of creations. Although Aquinas seems to keep the different levels and 
distinctions in the soul, he clarifies that due to this distinctive rational 
element of love, then the notion of pantheism we sense in Ibn Sina 
is false. Love, for Aquinas, is a formative and abiding gift that should 
be accepted through faith, and at the same time, must also be known 
through the reason.30 So, love is not only – in a sense – a “medium” of 
unification between God and for all kinds of creations as Ibn Sina may 
understand it. 
In the next part, I will consider Aquinas’ conceptions of reason, will, 
and how love may play in these parts of the human soul. For Aquinas, the 
goal and ultimate perfection of the human soul is by knowledge and by 
love to transcend the entire created order and to attain the first principle, 
who is God. This once again, I argue, is possible since love for Aquinas is 
considered as a rational gift from God, who although participate in grace, 
is still distinct from the human being. From the following discussion, I 
will later show this dimension of “internality” of grace is quite similar to 
Ibn Sina’s “internal” dimension of love due to emanation. 
28  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 2. a. 7,” https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/3002.html (access 11.07.2020)
29  Cf. Gerald J. Beyer, “The Love of God and Neighbor according to Aquinas: An Interpretation,” 
New Blackfriars 84, Nr. 98 (2003) 118.
30  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 2. a. 4,” https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/3002.html (access 11.07.2020).
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WiLL, passion and the primaCy of the rationaL Love
Following Christian tradition, Aquinas holds that love (or caritas) 
has the primacy among all other virtues. In Aquinas’ words: “love is 
the form of all virtues … in morals the form of an act is taken chiefly 
from the end.”31 Ultimately all virtues have love as their real end. This 
means that love directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end and, 
consequently, gives the form or perfect completeness to all other actions 
of virtues. This is easier to understand if we once again refer to the 
ontological relationship between love and the Holy Spirit, as we have 
seen in the previous section. In other words, love is the efficient cause 
and has the primacy of all virtues for its being the Holy Spirit Himself. 
But how does this kind of “divine” love work in human realms? This is an 
important question to answer since, in the discussion of the human soul, 
Aquinas – like Ibn Sina – finds that “love” can also be understood as part 
of the passion, of the appetitive and animal power. If for Ibn Sina, rational 
love might have the perishable nature when it comes to the appetitive and 
animal faculties, Aquinas that the rational love can never be perished. 
Aquinas tries to resolve the question on how God’s grace works in these 
different levels of human soul by analyzing the complicated threads 
of passion, will, and intellect. I want to utilize Aquinas “mechanism” 
of knowledge and intellectual love as starting points to recognize the 
different approach done by Ibn Sina in his Risālah fi al-’Ishq. I will also 
show that these differences would later open possible interpretation of 
Ibn Sina’s love as somehow deterministic compared to the Aquinas’.
Aquinas and the “Internal Mechanism” of Intellectual Love
Up to this point, we have seen that Aquinas defines love as both the 
primary virtue and uncreated grace: the Holy Spirit himself. This Divine 
and rational nature of love are inherent in his theory of creation and his 
understanding of who God is. But at the other part of Summa, we can 
also see the contrasting definition and origin of love. Aquinas also seems 
to accept that the common understanding of love as something that we 
have in our feeling faculty instead of the rational faculty. This critical 
part of Summa points that:
“Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the 
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and 
31  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 23. a. 8,” https://www.newadvent.org/
summa/3023.html (access 11.07.2020).
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flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense, charity loves 
God immediately, and other things through God. On the other 
hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know 
God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or 
by way of preeminence of negation as Dionysius states...”32 
To understand this text, we need to look further at Aquinas’ complex 
ideas about the nature of the human soul. Love is related to the layers of 
the human soul: “(1) the intellect (perceptive, apprehensive, cognitive), 
(2) the will (motive, appetitive, conative), and (3) the passions or 
feelings (sensitive, emotive).”33 Aquinas formulates his account of will 
primarily on the Aristotelian concept of rational appetite (boulêsis) 
in its association with reason and emotions. The will is the second 
constituent of the intellectual soul, while the appetite corresponds to the 
intellect itself. In general, Aquinas understands the will as “the faculty 
whose object is the good.”34 Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that human 
beings “who are endowed with both intellect and will are hardwired to 
certain general ends ordered to the most general goal of goodness. Will 
is rational desire: we cannot move towards that which does not appear 
to us at the time to be good.”35
Utilizing appetitive powers, we seek and desire things; we strive 
to unite ourselves (in various ways) with them. They are consequent 
upon knowledge. “Some inclination follows every form.”36 The will seeks 
not any particular good thing, but rather a general/universal sense of 
goodness. The act of determining which particular good to pursue is the 
task of the intellect, which evaluates judgments about certain things, 
events, or states of affairs. It then presents these to the will as good. 
In translation from the universal to the particular, the intellect must 
32  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 27. a. 4,” italics added, https://www.newadvent.
org/summa/3027.html (access 11.07.2020).
33  The Information Philosopher, s.v. “Thomas Aquinas,”   http://www.informationphilosopher.
com/solutions/philosophers/aquinas/  (access 15.08. 2020).
34  Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 69.
35  Timothy O’Connor and Christopher Franklin, s.v. “Free Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/
freewill/ (access 18.08.2020).
36  Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, I, q.80, a.1,” https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1080.
html (access 11.07.2020).
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depend on the phantasms, and here sin becomes possible.37 Phantasms 
are images produced by the imagination which represent the particular 
material objects perceived by the senses. To know an individual thing, the 
intellect must revert to phantasm. In formulating a particular judgment, 
the intellect must depend on the imagination, and here the possibility 
of corruption begins.38 Failure to choose the good impede the intellect’s 
“movement” from universal to particular. Passion works in several ways 
to impede the transition from habitual, universal knowledge to actual, 
particular knowledge: 
1. passion distracts attention from the prohibiting universal 
(tensions between sense appetite and intellect),
2. passions incline to the contrary of what is known in the universal,
3. passion alters the condition of the body, which in turn makes the 
image of the forbidden object more attractive.39
For Aquinas, the will is not independent of the intellect. Intellect 
and will “are engaged in dynamic, complex interaction, with multiple 
stages between initial perception and cognition by the intellect to the 
final action of the will, with occasional interruptions or overrides by 
the passions.”40 Aquinas’ doctrine of knowledge, although rooted in the 
senses’ external data, is nonetheless a capacity to be open to the infinite 
being. This ability to transcend particular beings allows man to think 
metaphysically and internally to analyze the general structure of being 
necessary for the world’s actual condition known through the senses. 
Until this point, Aquinas has shown us that love as amor could mean 
the desire or passion of the lower human faculty. What he means by that 
word amor usually applies both on an emotive level – love as a passion – 
and on a conative level. But at various parts of Summa, Aquinas also uses 
37  Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1995), 156-157.
38  Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will., 157.
39  In Summa Theologiae Ia Ilae q.25 a.2, Aquinas writes: “Good and evil are the object of the 
concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is the privation of good. 
Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object 
of which is evil, - that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a 
good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.” It seems that Aquinas agrees with Augustine 
in formulating love as the cause of all passions. The primacy of love is a feature of our being 
ordered - as desiring agents - to necessarily pursue the good. Cf. Jason A. Heron, “McCabe and 
Aquinas in Love and Natural Law,” in New Blackfriars 98, Nr. 1 (2017) 310.
40  Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 300-306.
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a special word for rational love, that is, “dilection” (dilectio). Dilection, 
for Aquinas, refers to any intellectual love, including the love that God 
has. Aquinas holds that wherever a human, as a rational being, loves, 
that love has the form of dilection.41 This rational love takes us to unity 
with God, a unity that we can always experience in our present life. 
From a human point of view, Aquinas examines that the human soul’s 
formal object, our mind, and our will, is infinite in nature. It means that 
love – which is also infinite in nature – exists primarily in the domain 
of human intellect. But Aquinas clearly emphasizes that this infinite or 
divine nature of rational love is not taking away our freedom. It does not 
determine the action in a direct way, as we have seen in the discussions 
of passion and will. Our instinctive response to God’s love is always 
free; it is a coordinative tension between will and intellect. This is an 
important element that makes us not merely an “outlet” of God’s self-
expression. Aquinas writes: 
“[W]hen the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement 
of love does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the 
human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this 
movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive 
power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose 
principle needs to be in itself, as stated above: so that it would follow 
that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, 
since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.”42
The choice to love rationally relates inseparably with the transcendental 
ability. This requires two acts. First, the intellect counsels. Second, 
the appetite accepts or rejects the counsels. When love as will that 
listens to the intellect counsels (which align themselves in the God’s 
law), love becomes the right action. That is why Aquinas seems to give 
the primacy to intellectual love as a love that overcomes passion and 
inclines itself to the Good. This inclination does not happen from human 
beings themselves. This inclination results from the grace, first from the 
interiority of human existence as given by God. 
All these elements of rational will and its “mechanism” of knowledge 
and judgment serve at least three things in our conversation of love. 
First, it is vital to realize that Aquinas also views different kinds of 
41  Gallagher, David M., “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others,” in Acta 
Philosophica 8, Nr. 1 (1999) 26.
42  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 23. a. 2,” italics added, https://www.
newadvent.org/summa/3023.html (access 11.07.2020).
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loves according to our inherent nature as the animal rationale. The 
distractive passionate love is a direct consequence of our emotive and 
conative powers as the creation with a soul. It is because of the different 
layers of the human soul, the ontological concept of love as ‘grace’ and 
as ‘Holy Spirit’ must be explained more existentially: as the judgmental 
process of the intellect, as the mastery of passions, and as the choice to 
act freely in our existing finite human nature. Second, Aquinas shows 
that the rational love in human life works in the “internal mechanism” of 
passion, will and intellect. This mechanism works not in a deterministic 
way since the will is always a result of choice to accept or to reject 
the intellect’s counsels. Therefore, the rational love, although present 
in the soul as the Holy Spirit himself, does not force someone to will 
and to act. The rational love that works in the intellect only creates 
the transcendental faculty in human beings that makes it possible 
for us to think, to judge and to choose freely and accordingly. I would 
like to return to Ibn Sina and see whether how the contingent beings 
utilize their inherent-intellectual love in the sensual parts of the soul. 
If we compare it with the Aquinas’ “internal mechanism” of intellectual 
judgment, would we be able to find the same indeterministic character 
of rational love in Ibn Sina concept of love?
Ibn Sina and the Deterministic Love
In Ibn Sina’s Risālah fi al-’Ishq, we can find a similar Aristotelian 
core conception of rational love used widely in Aquinas. For Ibn Sina, 
rational love is established upon the life of the rational soul. He also 
creates a distinction between the intellectual love and the other kind of 
love, which he calls “sensual love.” Sensual love is changeable, alterable, 
and unstable, while intellectual love is durable and unchanging. 
Intellectual love results from the in-depth perception of things and 
phenomena, whereas sensual love comes from a superficial perception 
of appearances. Therefore, sensual loves are limited and finite, whereas 
intellectual loves are unlimited and infinite.43 This distinction helps us 
to locate intellectual love in the narrative of God’s self-love. Ibn Sina 
writes: 
“If a man loves a beautiful form with animal desire, he deserves 
reproof, even condemnation and the charge of sin, as, for instance, 
those who commit unnatural adultery and in general people who go 
43  Hojjatolah Rafftari, “Happiness in View of Aristotle and Avicenna,” in International Journal of 
Social Science and Humanity 5, Nr. 8 (2015) 717.
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astray. But whenever he loves a pleasing form with an intellectual 
consideration, in the manner we have explained, then this is to 
be considered as an approximation to nobility and an increase in 
goodness. For he covets something whereby he will come nearer 
to the influence of that which is the First Source of influence 
and the Pure Object of love, and more similar to the exalted and 
noble beings. And this will dispose him to grace, generosity, and 
kindness.”44
Ibn Sina holds explicitly that the attribute of God’s self-love, God’s 
‘ishq, is “pure essence and being.” This kind of love undoubtedly belongs 
to the divine essence, which goes downward to all other contingent beings 
through the emanative schema. Thus, now we can see the equation 
attribute of ‘ishq equals divine essence equals ontological manifestation. 
According to this equation, then our intellects are somehow consubstantial 
with God’s intellects through the process of emanation. Gutas further 
explains that it is “[O]ur cosmic duty is to enable our intellects to reach 
their full potential and behave like the celestial ones; human beings 
should possess divine souls just as do the angels.”45 But it seems to me 
that there would be dangers in this cosmogony. I think Ibn Sina goes too 
far when he attempts to apply the Aristotelian principle of harmonia by 
matching the given intellectual love in human reality with the giver, the 
Pure Being. In short, Ibn Sina’s concept of rational love risks that the 
intelligible-contingent being might have been assimilated to the nature 
of God. This view would be inconsistent with the majority of both Islamic 
and Christian theological traditions that still consider the alterity of God 
from human realms as the consequence of the different nature between 
Creator and creation. Since Ibn Sina’s pantheistic view of the origin 
of love does not explain how it would work in the contingent realms, it 
opens a possible interpretation that love is deterministic. 
Suppose we cannot differentiate the divine love from all different 
actions in the different layers of the human soul. In that case, all of 
those actions can be rationally justified as long as it serves rightly as the 
“medium” of unification and perfection toward the Pure Being. Since all 
kinds of love in the contingent being is rational and divine as they flow 
from the emanative Pure Being, it would also entail that there is – in a 
sense – no distinct, separable line between our human will and God’s 
44  Ibn Sina, On Treatise of Love (Risālah fī al-‘ishq), trans. Emil L. Fackenheim, Mediaeval Studies 7, Nr. 
1 (1945) 221. Italics added. 
45  Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 379. 
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will. Therefore, in this schema, every act of love in Ibn Sina can be 
considered deterministic. It offers no element of choice, no ontological 
tensions between the incorruptible rational love and the perishable 
rational love.  This view is incompatible with Aquinas’ concept of love 
as the grace of God. Intellectual love in Ibn Sina is already determined 
by the internal capacity of the existing intelligible beings. Their level 
of perfection is already determined during the emanation process. 
For Aquinas, in contrast with Ibn Sina, the intellectual Divine love we 
possess still needs to work within this so-called ‘created’ natural law. 
The intellect’s task, according to Aquinas, is to always submit the will 
in the inclination to the good in a non-intrusive, non-deterministic way 
through human’s transcendental ability.
ConCLusion
This ontological study finds that both Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Sina 
agree that human capacity to love comes from the Divine being (through 
the emanation of the Pure Being for Ibn Sina and through the grace of 
the Holy Spirit for Aquinas). For Ibn Sina, all contingent beings possess a 
natural desire and an innate love implanted by the Pure Being. This love 
acts as a “medium” that brings every contingent being to its origin and to 
return to the Pure Being. Ibn Sina also holds that there are various levels 
and kinds of love in simple inanimate beings as well as in the vegetative, 
animal, and rational soul. Although Aquinas rejects Ibn Sina’s emanative 
theory, he also treats the relation of the creatures to God as one of a part 
to whole. Aquinas does so not in a pantheistic way such that all creatures 
would be parts of God. Instead, Aquinas employs this concept in his 
doctrine of participation to the grace, to the Holy Spirit that resides in 
the rational being’s love. 
I also find that Ibn Sina’s principle of harmonia in his cosmogony, 
intriguingly, opens a possible interpretation for a deterministic character 
of love. Since it is possible to blur the distinction of the Divine and human 
nature in the essence and actus of love, there is no need to talk about 
human freedom or free will. All kinds of love in the contingent beings are 
already directed in the process of unification and perfection since the 
rational has only the divine nature. My reading on Ibn Sina’s concept of 
love contrasts with Thomas Aquinas’ in two aspects. First, Aquinas holds 
that the Divine essence of love is God Himself, in which we participate 
in the actus of love. By maintaining the complexity of the different layers 
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in human love, love is viewed as God’s grace that is super-added to the 
natural power as the inclination. Love is formally united with the soul 
like the soul is the life of the body. Second, Aquinas argues that the actus 
of love results from the connatural knowledge of both the human’s and 
of God’s, which is heavily performed in reflective and critical reasoning 
capacity like. This distinction and the mechanism of ratio, in which the 
rational love occurs, maintain the concept of freedom and free will in 
human actions.
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